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Abstract - Vehicular Communication (VC) systems will greatly
enhance intelligent transportation systems. But their security
and the protection of their users’ privacy are a prerequisite for
deployment. Efforts in industry and academia brought forth a
multitude of diverse proposals. These have now converged to a
common view, notably on the design of a security infrastructure,
a Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that shall enable
secure conditionally anonymous VC. Standardization efforts and
industry readiness to adopt this approach hint to its maturity.
However, there are several open questions remaining, and it is
paramount to have conclusive answers before deployment. In
this article, we distill and critically survey the state of the art
for identity and credential management in VC systems, and we
sketch a roadmap for addressing a set of critical remaining
security and privacy challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
VC systems can greatly enhance transportation safety and
efficiency. Using VC, vehicles can directly communicate
[Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)] across one or multiple hops, or
they can exchange information with Roadside Units (RSUs)
[Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)]. The Cooperative Awareness
Message (CAM) and Decentralized Environmental Notifica-
tion Message (DENM) can disseminate valuable information
[1] on potentially dangerous vehicle movement (e.g., collision
avoidance), environmental hazards, traffic conditions, and
other location-relevant information or even assist regulating
traffic [2].
While the benefit is clear, such a large-scale deployment
enabling high-stake applications cannot materialize unless VC
systems are secure and do not expose users’ privacy. For
example, only legitimate VC on-board equipment should be
part of the system, and any modification or forgery of V2V
or V2I messages should be detected. The frequent beaconing
of safety CAMs should not leak the whereabouts of drivers
(or passengers) to anyone that deploys a set of commodity
radios. These concerns are well understood [3], and the results
of several significant projects and initiatives led to a set of
common tools and approaches.
V2V and/or V2I (V2X) communication is protected with the
help of public key cryptography where a set of certification
authorities (CAs) provide credentials to legitimate vehicles.
The credentials are then anonymized, and they are short-lived,
which enhances privacy and maintains non-repudiation. The
system maintains a mapping of these short-term identities
to a long-term identity of the vehicle. These ideas can be
found in the first VC security architecture [4], elaborated by
the SeVeCom project as well as in subsequent projects [e.g.,
CAMP [5] and Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-X Communication
Systems (PRESERVE) (http://www.preserve-project.eu/)] and
technical standardization documents, notably the IEEE 1609.2
WG (IEEE P1609.2/D12, Draft Standard for Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments, January 2012), European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI) (ETSI TR-102-731,
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) Security; Security Services
and Architecture and ETSI TR-102-941, Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) Security; Trust and Privacy Management), and
harmonization documents [Car2Car Communication Consor-
tium (C2C-CC) (http://www.car-2-car.org/) [6]]. More impor-
tant, there is a willingness to proceed fast, in the near future,
with rolling out the first instances of VC protected accordingly.
This can be seen positively, as a vote of confidence, to
these available solutions, and there are already Field Opera-
tional Testing (FOT) efforts, seeking to bring them closer to
deployment. Furthermore, such security and privacy protection
is essentially a baseline. It addresses significant yet specific
VC problems, but it leaves a range of possible optimizations
of secure VC protocols, as well as the protection of the in-car
network and software and information the whole system relies
on (e.g., reliable time and location, and, thus, secure global
positioning). The question this raises is: do we indeed have a
cornerstone to build upon secure and privacy-protecting VC
systems? More precisely, do we have all the answers needed to
deploy an identity and credential management infrastructure
for VC?
To address this question, we critically survey the literature,
distilling the latest understanding in academia and industry. A
set of open questions remains, and they need to be addressed
before deployment. For example, user privacy is not thor-
oughly protected against infrastructure entities (servers) that
are honest but curious, or VPKI entities do not enforce policies
or are not equipped to preclude special types of misbehavior
(disruption or privacy breach related). These issues are primar-
ily technical ones, calling for necessary research. However,
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Fig. 1. Secure and privacy-protecting V2X communication.
they also relate to nontechnical considerations, which affect
the systems that will eventually be deployed. In this article,
we focus on the technical considerations and briefly discuss
how they relate to other factors and the potential deployment
scenarios.
In the rest of this paper, we first provide a brief overview of
security and privacy-protecting VC systems, focusing mostly
on the security infrastructure entities (Sec. II). Then, we dis-
cuss a number of important VPKI components and operation
requirements (Sec. III), critically comparing how the related
literature approaches and addresses (or not) these problems.
For example, we are concerned with the overall robustness
of the secure VC, the protection of user privacy, and the
practicality of alternative proposals. We find that there are not
only distinct approaches but in some cases conflicting views.
More important, we realize that there are a number of technical
considerations and questions that still have no conclusive
answers. We outline those focusing on the deployment of an
identity and credential management infrastructure (Sec. IV).
II. SHAPING THE VC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Each vehicle is equipped with a set of short-term certificates,
termed pseudonyms, each with a corresponding short-term
private key to sign outgoing messages. Fig. 1 illustrates
this: Vehicle A digitally signs outgoing messages (time- and
geo-stamped) with the private key, kiv , corresponding to the
pseudonym P iv ({P iv}(PCA) represents the pseudonym signed
by the pseudonym issuer) and is attached to messages to
facilitate verification on the receiver side. Receiving vehicles
B and C verify the pseudonym {P iv}(PCA) and validate the
signature (assuming they trust the pseudonym issuer discussed
below). This process ensures the authenticity and integrity of
the message and enables further validation based on its content.
At the same time, transmissions by vehicle A do not reveal
its identity (as the short-term certificates are anonymised), and
messages signed under different pseudonyms (with different
private keys) are, in principle, unlinkable. Vehicles switch
from one pseudonym to another (not previously used) to
achieve unlinkability.
Security Infrastructure Entities: A VPKI comprises a set
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Fig. 2. Hierarchical organization of the VC security infrastructure.
of authorities with distinct roles: the Root Certification Author-
ity (RCA), the Long Term Certification Authority (LTCA), the
Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA), and the Resolution
Authority (RA). Different proposals may refer to these entities
with various names, e.g., CAMP [5] refers to the LTCA as
the Enrollment Certification Authority (ECA). The RCAs are
the highest-level authorities certifying LTCAs, PCAs, and
RAs. An LTCA is responsible for registering vehicles and
issuing Long Term Certificates (LTCs). A PCA issues sets of
pseudonyms for the registered vehicles. An RA can initiate a
process to resolve a pseudonym, i.e., identify the long-term
identity of the vehicle that used (in a nonrepudiable manner)
its short-term keys and credentials.
Trust Associations: Fig. 2 illustrates a generalized hier-
archical organization of the VC security infrastructure, with
multiple LTCA and PCA entities shown (as those are primarily
involved in interactions with the vehicles).
VC systems will be deployed widely, thus one can envision
that higher-level CAs (HCAs) could be established to facilitate
a trust establishment across distinct parts of the hierarchy.
Without loss of generality, let the corresponding numbers of
HCAs, LTCAs and PCAs, be denoted by K , L and M , so
that K ≤ L ≤ M . It is also possible to have direct cross-
certification between CAs. There may be direct communica-
tion needed among CAs, e.g., for lookup operations while
issuing credentials.
VPKI Structure: In VC systems, a domain was first
described [3] as a set of mobile nodes registered with an
authority, with communication independent of administrative
or geographical boundaries. Alternatively, a domain could be
defined as a (fine- or coarse-grained) geographic region, each
with the corresponding CAs. The former definition is more
general and it is assumed here. A set of vehicles registered
with only one LTCA can obtain credentials from several
PCAs, subject to compatible policies, as long as the two CAs
have a trust association. In a multidomain environment, we
must determine how to identify available PCAs and inter-
CA trust associations when roaming in a foreign region or
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VC Standards and Harmonization
Cryptographic Primitives
Asymmetric Key
Symmetric
Key
Hash
Functions
IEEE 1609.2 ECC: ECDSA (P-224 or P-256 curves) or ECIES (P-256 curve) AES-CCM SHA-256
ETSI ECC: ECDSA (only P-256 curve) or ECIES (P-256 curve) AES-CCM SHA-256
C2C-CC LTC (ECDSA-256) and Pseudonyms (ECDSA-224) — SHA-256
interacting with vehicles and roadside infrastructure from a
foreign domain; a lightweight directory access protocol service
can facilitate this [7].
Cryptographic Primitives: Table I shows cryptographic
primitives considered in standardization documents (IEEE
P1609.2/D12, Draft Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments, January 2012, ETSI TR-102-731, Intelligent
Transport Systems Security; Security Services and Architec-
ture, and ETSI TR-102-941, Intelligent Transport Systems
Security; Trust and Privacy Management), and harmonization
efforts. The motivation for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is that it produces shorter signatures than
the ones by the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem.
IEEE 1609.2 considers a Discrete Logarithm and Elliptic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (DL/ECIES) to protect
communication during the pseudonym acquisition phase, as do
other proposals. Symmetric cryptography, i.e. an Advanced
Encryption Standard in Counter Mode with a Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM), is pro-
posed for other wireless networking standards IEEE 802.11 or
Zigbee/IEEE 802.15.4 (IEEE P1609.2/D12 document).
III. VC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
In most of the literature [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], including
standardization documents (IEEE P1609.2/D12, ETSI TR-102-
731, and ETSI TR-102-941), the VPKI entities are assumed
fully trustworthy. This is a reasonable assumption; however,
recent experience from mobile computing applications and
Location-Based Services (LBSs) shows that applications and
services aggressively collect user information. While they
may remain trustworthy, not deviating from their protocol
specifications and offering reliable services to their users,
service providers can be tempted to infer sensitive user infor-
mation and profile users (e.g., attempting to monetize this by
offering customized services), based solely on the prescribed
functionality.
This type of deviation relates to the honest-but-curious
adversarial model, considered by [5, 7]. In the VC context,
VPKI servers (e.g., LTCAs and PCAs) are considered to
be honest, complying with security policies and correctly
executing protocols, but also curious, seeking to infer user-
sensitive information. This can be especially tempting, because
a transcript of V2X communication (e.g., as it could be
collected by a mesh network of VC-compatible radios) could
be converted into a rich set of user trajectories and profiles if
processed with the information that the VPKI entities possess.
This concern, aggravated by a potential spread of the respon-
sibility to run credential and identity providers, is discussed
first in this section. In spite of the common understanding
that VPKI servers should have well-defined distinct roles,
safeguarding users from honest-but-curious servers is not
trivial and, in most cases, not achieved. At the same time,
current VPKI designs do not fully prevent abuse of anonymity
(or, to be precise, pseudonymity) by malicious (dishonest)
clients, i.e., vehicles or RSUs. This can be seen as a by-product
of the role separation. The second part of this section surveys
how to improve VPKIs to render VC more trustworthy.
A. Privacy Considerations
Before issuing pseudonyms, the PCA either communicates
with an LTCA to have the requester (vehicle) VPKI server
authenticated or authenticates the vehicle itself. Several VPKI
schemes [5, 8, 9, 12] follow the former approach, i.e., the
C2C-CC design proposal where the PCA directly communi-
cates with the vehicle’s LTCA. Another set of VPKI schemes
[7, 11, 13] proposes an indirect involvement of the LTCA,
which issues a token to the vehicle that can be presented and
verified by the PCA before issuing the pseudonyms.
For both approaches, the motivation is to maintain distinct
roles, i.e., to separate the long-term identification of the
vehicles from their short-term identities (their pseudonyms).
A PCA should ideally be assured that it serves a legitimate
vehicle, without accessing the long-term identity and creden-
tials of the vehicle. On the other hand, the LTCA should
not know which pseudonyms the vehicle obtained (and for
which period). If either of the two happened, then a single
VPKI entity would breach user privacy: the actions (signed
messages) of the vehicle, matched to its pseudonyms, would be
linked to each other and the vehicle long-term identity. For the
same reason, the overall vehicle-PCA-LTCA communication
should not be accessible by any other observer.
A common issue for all schemes proposed in the literature
is that the PCA can trivially link the pseudonyms issued for
a vehicle in one pseudonym request. CAMP [5] proposes a
proxy-based scheme that the Registration Authority (a proxy to
validate, process, and forward pseudonym requests to the PCA)
shuffles the requests from the vehicles before forwarding them
to the PCA so that the PCA cannot identify which pseudonyms
belong to which vehicle. As a result, the registration authority
could not link the pseudonyms to the cocoon public keys in
the certificate requests, thus to the vehicles, even if it is fed
by the transcripts of (pseudo-)anonymized signed messages.
It is more important to prevent a PCA from linking sets of
pseudonyms issued for the same vehicle as responses to two or
more distinct requests (i.e., pseudonym acquisition protocols).
This can be achieved by most proposals as they explicitly
preclude, for example, the use of long-term credentials or the
use of an available pseudonym for vehicle authentication.
However, the involvement of the LTCA in authenticating
the client reveals information. In most proposals, the LTCA
learns which vehicle requests service from which PCA, and,
thus, the actual pseudonym acquisition time. This information,
along with some default policy data, could make it easy to
guess which set of pseudonyms (thus, which set of signed
messages) correspond to which vehicle (long-term identity).
The problem has been identified only in a recent token-based
scheme [7]. It hides from the LTCA the timing information
as well as the PCA from which the vehicle seeks to obtain its
next set of pseudonyms.
The ramifications of pseudonym lifetime and the use of time
information to link pseudonyms are discussed further in the
‘‘challenges’’ section. Moreover, decoupling the LTCA and
the PCA knowledge for the sake of privacy raises security
and resilience considerations. This is discussed further when
we consider revocation (which necessitates maintaining a
mapping of short- and long-term identities, unless the scheme
is fully anonymized [9]).
B. Resilience considerations
In a multidomain VC system with a multiplicity of PCAs,
a compromised vehicle could obtain multiple (sets of) simul-
taneously valid pseudonyms simply by submitting multiple
requests to distinct PCAs. This presumes a minimal protection
to reject spurious requests from the same vehicle and to
issue a set of nonoverlapping pseudonyms as a response
to each request. With multiple short-term private/public key
pairs and the corresponding certificates (pseudonyms), the
attacking vehicle could appear as multiple vehicles. It could,
for example, inject multiple erroneous hazard notifications and
mislead the system (while, perhaps, a single report would not
suffice to raise an alarm).
This ‘‘Sybil-based’’ misbehavior, the acquisition of multiple
simultaneously valid credentials, is not considered in the
C2C-CC and CAMP [5] designs. A number of other proposals
[8, 9, 12, 13] do not manage to prevent this without any
provision to tie the pseudonym acquisition period to a request.
It is not straightforward to have the LTCA enforce a policy
without revealing information, unless a specific design is put
in place to keep information and still allow a policy to be
enforced. For example, [7] does not reveal information to the
LTCA since the vehicles hide their actual requested interval
to obtain pseudonyms with universally fixed lifetimes deter-
mined by the LTCA. Thus, vehicles can obtain pseudonyms
within the requested time interval without revealing the actual
pseudonym acquisition period.
Note that these issues emerge exactly because of the
generalization of the system setup and the strengthening of
the adversarial model, compared to earlier works, which
nonetheless propose alternatives such as the reliance on a
Hardware Security Module (HSM) (ensuring that all signatures
are generated under a single valid pseudonym at any time)
[14].
C. Revocation
In case of misbehavior, the wrongdoer can be evicted (i.e.,
prevented from further participating in the system). This is
standardized in the Internet, and it is considered for long-
term VC credentials, the LTC of vehicles, and the security
infrastructure entities. Nonetheless, what is distinctive here is
the multiplicity of short-term credentials used by the vehicles
and the need to revoke those as well. Interestingly, the
standardization documents (IEEE P1609.2/D12, ETSI TR-102-
731, and ETSI TR-102-941) and harmonization (C2C-CC)
efforts are inconclusive on that front.
The distinction of VPKI roles offers an interesting option:
the vehicle can be shunned off by the LTCA, which does
corroborate its legitimacy to the PCA [14], thus preventing
the vehicle from obtaining any additional pseudonyms. This
alone, of course, does not prevent a compromised vehicle
from misbehaving while using any pseudonyms it has (and the
corresponding private keys) until they expire. The revocation
of pseudonyms is necessary to close down this vulnerability
window. Consider, for example, the practice outlined in the
C2C-CC documentation, which recommends preloading the
vehicle with approximately 1,500 pseudonyms to be used for
one year. An active malicious disruption from an ‘‘insider’’
for a significant fraction of a year could be disastrous.
One can reduce this vulnerability by requiring that vehicles
interact with the VPKI regularly, e.g., once per day or a few
times per day, or at least as frequently as the dissemination of
revocation information by the PCAs. Still, within this period,
the high-stakes nature of VC, possibly risking the well-being
of individuals and property, can necessitate a reaction, i.e.,
revocation of pseudonyms.
The pseudonym revocation can be done by ‘‘traditional’’
methods adjusted to the requirements of VC. The distribution
of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) has been assumed by
several proposals [5, 7, 11, 13]. It was investigated [15, 16],
along with localized distributed protocols to protect against
wrongdoers until they are revoked [17]. It was also inte-
grated in recently implemented systems along with a brief
comparison with the online certificate status protocol [7].
The challenge of timely dissemination of credential validity
information that does not interfere with vehicle operation
remains.
IV. CHALLENGES
Based on and beyond the technical discussion in the
previous sections, here we discuss a number of significant
challenges for the identity and credential management of
fundamental importance toward deploying a secure VC system.
We extend this discussion by considering a non-technical
operational uncertainty at this point.
Pseudonym Lifetime Policy: The more frequent the
changes, the more effective the privacy protection (the higher
the unlinkability); ideally, each pseudonym should be used
for a single message authentication. However, this could be
excessively costly, e.g., if one considers the high-rate safety
beaconing (e.g., three to ten beacons per second) and the
resultant large numbers of pseudonyms to be provided to each
vehicle. Equally important, safety applications necessitate par-
tial linkability, over a period, to facilitate their task. For exam-
ple, inferring a collision hazard based on logically unlinkable
CAMs would be hard (e.g., needing strictly use of location
information) and error prone. Thus, a ‘‘compromise’’ was
considered early on with partial linkability (over the lifetime
of the pseudonym) [3], while several proposals investigated
when/how to change pseudonyms for effective protection.
Some current considerations suggest, antidiametrically, using
one or a few pseudonyms per day. This divergence of views
comes along with the fact that standards and harmonization
efforts have not established any guideline for the pseudonym
lifetime or other policies. This is clearly a necessity, indepen-
dently of the flexibility the user would like to enjoy.
A significant consideration that is not pertinent to the
privacy-effectiveness tradeoff relates to security. As discussed
earlier, without the necessary design, attacking vehicles could
amplify the effect of their misbehavior when they obtain
multiple simultaneously valid credentials. One approach to
prevent this, mentioned previously, is to issue pseudonyms
with nonoverlapping lifetimes. This tends to become de facto
or implicitly common. However, when combined with flexible
access to the PCA, as the user needs to, this can undermine
unlinkability and timing information can reduce uncertainty
and make sets of pseudonyms obtained by the same user
linkable (more likely to be). This was recently discovered and
a countermeasure was outlined based on enforcing a specific
pseudonym lifetime policy [7]. Again, this emphasizes the
need to standardize policies with clear objectives.
Revocation: As discussed previously, there is no consensus
on the need and the method for revocation of pseudonyms.
While several VPKI proposals address the need of pseudonym
revocation [5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16], standardization bodies and
harmonization efforts propose revocation of only long-term
credentials, but not the pseudonyms. Moreover, revocation
could be necessary for other reasons (e.g., revoking an at-
tribute of a whole class of vehicles [18]). Essentially, there is
a tradeoff between vulnerability and cost, which also rises if
one seeks to reduce risk by mandating more frequent vehicle-
VPKI interactions. This needs to be explored, along with a
clear determination of a policy on what events necessitate
revocation.
Extending to Anonymous Authentication Primitives: Al-
though classic public-key cryptography has been a pillar for
TABLE II
LATENCY FOR ISSUING 100 PSEUDONYMS.
DPCA (ms) CPUPCA (GHz)
VeSPA [11] 817 3.4
SEROSA [13] 650 2.0
PUCA [9] 1,000 2.53
SR-VPKI [7] 260 2.0
securing VC systems, there have been proposals to leverage
anonymous authentication in the context of VC. Calandriello
et al. [19] use group signatures for vehicles to issue on-the-
fly pseudonyms with two follow-up investigations in [20] and
[21]; Studer et al. [10], Lin et al. [22], and Lu et al. [23]
also propose the use of group signature protocols with the
former using keys as long-term credentials; and Fo¨rster et al.
[9] use zero-knowledge proofs [24] to the VPKI infrastructure.
A convergence with the standardized approaches could yield
significant benefits, and, thus, a recommendation for additional
investigations.
Extensive Experimental Validation: In the light of the
VC large-scale multidomain environment, the efficiency of
the VPKI and, more broadly, its scalability are important.
Thus far, this has received limited attention, with few schemes
evaluating implementation performance. Table II shows the
latency to issue 100 pseudonyms in different VPKI systems.
The dual-core CPU clock is provided only as an indication of
the processing power, but clearly a direct comparison is not
straightforward with the available information, although the
four experimental setups resemble or are at least close to each
other. The motivation is to highlight the need for extensive
experimental evaluation to ensure the viability (in terms of
performance and cost) of the VPKI as the VC system scales
up.
Operational Challenges: As discussed in the ‘‘Shaping
the VC Security Infrastructure’’ section, a domain is not yet
precisely defined across different standardization documents
and efforts. The key questions are who will operate the identity
and credential provision and how trust relationships will be
established. Moreover, policies that determine how to select
and certify these VPKI entities are necessary. At the same
time, VC systems will also operate as an extension of the
mobile Internet, offering other (e.g, infotainment) services to
their users. This would raise the question of how to manage
identities and credentials for those applications and how to
enable a coexistence of the two ‘‘worlds.’’
In conclusion, it is necessary to pave the way for the de-
ployment of secure and privacy-protecting VC systems with an
identity and credential management infrastructure that builds
upon the past multiyear efforts and developed understanding,
and addresses a number of open questions to achieve enhanced
protection (of the system and its users) and scalability as VC
becomes ubiquitous.
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